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In re Cecchini: Willful and Malicious
Injury-Nondischargeability in Bankruptcy
The Bankruptcy Code' operates to discharge or release a debtor
from all debts, 2 subject to express exceptions provided within the
Code.' One exception to discharge is set forth in section 523(a)(6),
which makes a debt due to "'willful and malicious' injury to another
entity4 or to the property of another entity" nondischargeable.5 The
bankruptcy, district, and circuit court decisions, however, have reached
inconsistent results regarding the interpretation of the phrase "willful
and malicious injury."' 6 Recently, in In re Cecchini,7 the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals ruled that section 523(a)(6) does not require
proof of an intentional injury, but instead, only requires proof of
an intentional act which necessarily leads to injury."
Part I of this note sets forth the facts and rationale of In re
Cecchini.' Part II discusses the legal background surrounding the in-
terpretation of the phrase "willful and malicious" under the Bank-
1. Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549-2657 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§101-151326 (1978)).
2. See 11 U.S.C. §101(11) (debt means "liability on a claim"). "Claim" is defined as (A)
"a right to payment, whether or not such a right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unli-
quidated, fixed, contigent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured,
or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced
to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
unsecured." Id. at §101(4).
3. Porter, Bankruptcy - Survival of Liability for Willful and Malicious Injury, 35 REP.
J. 53 (1961). See generally 11 U.S.C. §523.
4. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6) substitutes the word "entity" for "person." 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY §523.16 at 523-127-28. "Person" includes an individual, partners, and corpora-
tion; "entity" includes a person, estate, trust and governmental unit. Id. at 523-128.
5. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6) Title 11 U.S.C. §523 states in relevant part:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141 or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge
an individual debtor from any debt . ..
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property
of another entity.
6. Compare In re Adams, 761 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985) (willful and malicious
injury means the "intentional doing of a wrongful act with knowledge of its probable conse-
quences") with In re Compos, 768 F.2d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 1985) (willful and malicious
injury requires proof of intent to injure).
7. 780 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals withdrew the opin-
ion filed October 4, 1985 (772 F.2d 1493) and substituted the present opinion. Compare In
re Cecchini, 772 F.2d 1493 (1985) with In re Cecchini, 780 F.2d 1440.
8. Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1443.
9. See infra notes 12-42 and accompanying text.
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Plaintiff, operator of a hotel in Baja, Mexico, entered into an agree-
ment with C.V.R. Investments (CVR), a partnership consisting of the
defendants, Robustelli and Cecchini, and one other partner. 12 The
agreement provided that CVR would attempt to induce American
tourists to travel to Mexico and stay in plaintiff's hotel." As part
of the agreement, plaintiff was to reimburse CVR for promotional
expenses incurred, and defendants were to collect and forward prepay-
ment checks received from American tourists to plaintiff.'
4
During the course of the agreement, Cecchini and Robustelli came
to believe that plaintiff was not reimbursing CVR for promotional
expenses.'" Acting on this belief, Cecchini instructed a CVR employee
to have the prepayment checks endorsed and deposited directly into
the CVR partnership account, rather than being sent to the plain-
tiff.'6 Plaintiff discovered that defendants had converted the prepay-
ment monies and brought suit to recover the funds and damages.' 7
Defendants entered into a stipulated judgment in favor of plaintiff
in 1977.18 In 1981, however, each defendant filed voluntary Chapter
7 bankruptcy petitions.' 9
Plaintiff filed an adversary proceeding seeking a determination that
the debtors' personal liabilities on the judgment were nondischargeable
under the willful and malicious injury exception. 20 The bankruptcy
court held that debtors' liabilities to plaintiff were dischargeable, and
the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. 2' The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed.22
10. See infra notes 43-131 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 132-154 and accompanying text.
12. Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1441-42.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. In reality, the other partner of CVR not involved in the present case, William
Van der Meer, had intercepted plaintiff's timely payments and converted the money to his






21. See In re Cecchini, 37 Bankr. 671 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984).
22. See In re Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1441.
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B. The Opinion
The Court of Appeals in Cecchini first looked to previous judicial
interpretations of "willful and malicious injury." 23 To fall within the
exception of section 523(a)(6), the injury to an entity must be both
willful and malicious. 24 The word willful means "deliberate or inten-
tional."' 25 The word malicious means "wrongful and without cause
or excuse, even in absence of personal hatred, spite, or ill-will."
2 6
Therefore, the Cecchini court found that a wrongful act done inten-
tionally, which necessarily results in harm and is without just cause
or excuse, constitutes a willful and malicious injury. 2
The court relied upon In re Adams" to support this interpretation
of the statute.29 In Adams, the Ninth Circuit held that a finding of
23. Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1442-43. The court should ascertain legislative intent when inter-
preting statutes. Id.; Pressley v. Capital Credit & Collection Service, 760 F.2d 922, 924 (9th
Cir. 1985). The intent may be ascertained from the plain language of the statute, or from
looking to the legislative history. Id. See generally SADS, 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. §49.11
(4th Ed. 1972).
24. Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1442-43. Willful and malicious are in the conjuctive. In re
McGiboney, 8 Bankr. 987, 989 (1981); Hartman, The Dischargeability of Debts in Bankruptcy,
15 VAND. L.R. 13, 26; In re Carncross, 114 F. Supp 119 (1953) (something more than intention
is necessary to constitute malice because the words malicious and intentional are not synonymous).
25. Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1443; see also H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 363
(1977); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 77-79 (1978). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
(BAP) interpreted "willful and malicious" as modifying the word injury. In re Cecchini, 37
Bankr. at 675. But see Notes of the Committee on the Judiciary of both Senate and House,
which follow the actual text of the statute: "Under this paragraph, 'willful' means deliberate
or intentional." Id. By substituting "intentional" for "willful" in the statute, the result is
"intentional and malicious injury," or simply "intentional injury." Id. "If Congress had in-
tended the phrase to modify the debtor's act rather than the injury, the statute would read:
a debt for a willful and malicious act by the debtor causing injury to another entity or proper-
ty of another entity." Id.
26. Id.; Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 486 (1902); In re Kearney Chemicals, Inc., 468
F. Supp. 1107 (1979); Vickers v. Home Indem. Co., 546 F.2d 1149, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977); see
also In re Grace, 22 Bankr. 653, 656 (1982) (malicious means wrongful and without just cause
or excuse, rather than the more rigid standard requiring actual and conscious intent to do
harm); Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 704 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1983) (malicious means absence
of just cause or excuse); In re Wooten, 30 Bankr. 357, 358 (1983) (personal ill will towards
injured party is not a requirement of willful and malicious injury); In re La Casse, 28 Bankr.
214, 217 (1983) (neither personal animosity nor specific intention to cause damage to a par-
ticular person or thing is a requirement of willful and malicious injury). A malignant spirit
or specific intention to hurt a particular person is not an essential element. Tinker, 193 U.S.
at 486. Malice means an injurious act which demonstrates a "depraved inclination"' to disregard
the rights of others. Id. at 486-87.
27. Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1443; Tinker, 193 U.S. at 487.
28. 761 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1985).
29. Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1443. Regarding statutory construction, the court in Adams found
that when a former statute is amended, or a doubtful meaning clarified by subsequent legisla-
tion, such amendment or legislation is strong evidence of legislative intent of the first statute.
Adams, 761 F.2d at 1427; Sands, supra note 23, at §49.11; Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co.,
43 Cal. 2d 227 (1954). Whether a subsequent statute or amendment sheds light on the meaning
of a former statute depends upon the circumstances under which the additional legislation takes
1513
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specific intent to injure was not required to support a finding that
the act falls within the scope of section 523(a)(6).3 Moreover, proof
that the defendant had knowledge of the probable consequences of
an act was not necessary to show willfulness and maliciousness. 3' In-
stead, the Adams court ruled that nondischargeability is measured
by the nature of the act, rather than by the nature of the liability. 1
Thus, according to the Adams court, all liabilities resulting from in-
tentional tortious acts are nondischargeable.1 3
place. 2A Sands, supra note 23 at 49.11. The court in Adams viewed the existing conflict among
the bankruptcy and circuit courts as an indication that a subsequent amendment is intended
to clarify, rather than change, existing law. Adams, 761 F.2d at 1427; see also 2A Sands,
supra note 23 at §49.11.; Callejas v. McMahon, 750 F.2d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 1984); Brown
v. Marquette Savings and Loan Assoc., 686 F.2d 608, 615 (7th Cir. 1982) ("one method of
interpreting the significance of subsequent amendments to a statute takes dispute or ambiguity,
such as a split in the circuits, to be an indication that a subsequent amendment is intended
to clarify, rather than change, the existing law."); United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111, 121
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 952 ("an amendment to an existing statute is not an
acknowledgement by Congress that the original statute is invalid"). A common and customary
legislative procedure is to enact amendments to strengthen and clarify existing law. Id. Accord-
ingly, the court in Adams found that Congress enacted §523(a)(9) to clarify the ambiguity of
§523(a)(6). Adams, 761 F.2d at 1427. Section 523(a)(9) provides that debts arising out of
judgments for injuries resulting from drunk driving are nondischargeable. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(9).
Injuries resulting from drunk driving have generally not been determined to constitute inten-
tional injuries, but rather, merely intentional acts resulting in injury. See e.g., Matter of Wooten,
8 Collier Bankr. Cas. 994 (1983); In re Compos, 768 F.2d 1155 (1985). Therefore, an intentional
act resulting in injury is sufficient to support a finding of willfulness and malice as contemplated
by §523(a)(6). Adams, 761 F.2d at 1427-28.
But see 2A Sands, supra note 23 at §49.11 (many cases hold that a statute is amended or
changed, thus resolving doubtful meaning, to evidence that the previous statute meant the con-
trary). This theory is based on the fact that the legislature is not presumed to perform a useless
act. Id.
30. Adams, 761 F.2d at 1427; In re Coen, 458 F.2d 326, 329 (9th Cir. 1972).
31. Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1443.
32. Coen, 458 F.2d at 329. Both compensatory and punitive damages may be awarded
by the jury for willful and malicious injuries, and when the record clearly indicates that com-
pensatory damages were awarded for willful and malicious acts, that award is not dischargeable
in bankruptcy, and neither is the award for punitive damages. Id. In other words, courts generally
look behind judgments to the nature of the action in which the judgments were rendered. Bankr.
L. Ed. §7:122 at 130; 9A Am Jur 2d Bankruptcy §805 at 555. See e.g., Greenfield v. Tuccillo,
129 F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1972) (form of judgment itself does not control the issue of
dischargeability of liability arising out of willful and malicious injury, and the entire record
may be referred to in determining the dischargeability); Jaco v. Baker, 148 P.2d 938, 942 (1944)
(when the action was predicated on a willful and intentional act, namely, the keeping of a
vicious dog with knowledge of the dog's viciousness, the fact that the judge instructed the
jury that punitive damages could not be awarded did not establish that the judgment in the
action was necessarily dischargeable in bankruptcy); In re Wernecke, I F. Supp 127, 128 (1932)
(failure of the jury to award exemplary damages did not render a judgment meeting other
requirements for §523(a)(6) exemption dischargeable).
33. Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1443; Adams, 761 F.2d at 1428; see also Coen, 458 F.2d at
329 (nondischargeability of liability is measured by the nature of the act); In re Franklin, 726
F.2d 606, 610 (10th Cir. 1984) (" 'willful and malicious' requires the intentional doing of an
act which necessarily leads to injury"); Matter of Quezada, 718 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1983)
(willful means a deliberate and intentional act which necessarily leads to injury); In re DeRosa,
20 Bankr. 307, 313 (1982) (intent to do the wrongful act is sufficient to constitute willful and
malicious).
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The court in Cecchini next attacked the issue of whether the debt
arising out of the specific act of conversion was nondischargeable.
34
The court held that conversion, if committed intentionally and without
justification or excuse, constitutes willful and malicious injury.
35
Further, proof of malice toward the individual is not required to render
the debt nondischargeable. 36  Accordingly, intentional conversion
necessarily produces harm and is without just cause or excuse, and
therefore, is willful and malicious, even absent proof of a specific
intent to injure.3 The court determined that Cecchini clearly intended
to convert the plaintiff's funds to CVR, and Cecchini succeeded.38
Consequently, Cecchini's debt to plaintiff was held nondischargeable.39
Addressing the applicability of section 523(a)(6) to the discharge-
ability of Cecchini's partner, Robustelli, the court found that the record
revealed no evidence that Robustelli was directly involved in converting
the funds. Robustelli and Cecchini, however, were partners in CVR.1°
Furthermore, Cecchini was acting on behalf of the partnership and
in the ordinary course of business of the partnership when he con-
verted the funds.' Thus, applying basic principles of partnership law,
the court imputed Cecchini's knowledge and intent to Robustelli in
finding that Robustelli's debt was also nondischargeable.42
34. Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1443.
35. Id.; 3 Collier supra note 4 §523, at 523-130; see e.g., In re McCloud, 7 Bankr. 819
(1980) (debtor's disposition of livestock securing loans constituted a conversion of bank's pro-
perty; debt was therefore nondischargeable); In re Auvenshine, 9 Bankr. 772 (1981). A technical
conversion, however, may not be deemed willful or malicious. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co.,
293 U.S. 328 (1934).
36. McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138, 142 (1916); In re DeRosa, 20 Bankr. at 313;
In re McGibboney, 8 Bankr. 987, 989 (1981); see e.g., In re Jordan, 12 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1135
(debtor's intentional sale of stock certificates which debtor knew were mistakenly credited to
her account, though not motivated by any animosity toward the brokerage house, demonstrates
the type of malice addressed in §523(a)(6)).




41. Id. The Uniform Partnership Act provides that a partnership is liable for the debts
incurred when one partner, acting within the scope of his apparent authority, commits an act
of conversion. 60 Am Jur 2d Partnership §167 (1964). Individual partners are also liable when
the partnership in the course of business receives money or property which is misapplied by
any partner while the money or property is in the custody of the partnership. Id. Note, however,
that neither the firm nor other innocent partners are liable for conversion which is not effected
in the course of the firm's business. Id.
42. Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1444; see McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138, 139 (1916).
Partners are individually responsible for torts committed by members of their firm while acting
within the general scope of business, regardless of whether the particular partner personally
participated in the tortious act. Id. at 139. If the defendant is the alter ego of a corporation,
malicious and willful injuries caused by employees of a corporation, even though the defendant
did not personally commit the acts, will be imputed to the defendant, and thus, liabilities arising
1515
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Since 1898, an exception to the bankruptcy discharge has been pro-
vided for liabilities arising from "willful and malicious" injuries to
the person or property of another.43 Tinker v. Colwell4 was the first
case in which the United States Supreme Court addressed the legal
issues surrounding this exception.
As a result of Mr. Tinker having an extramarital affair with Mrs.
Colwell, judgment for criminal conversation" was rendered in favor
of Mr. Colwell.6 Tinker filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition, inter
alia, to avoid the debt.47 The Supreme Court, however, refused to
discharge the obligation represented by Mr. Colwell's judgment,
holding that the judgment was one for willful and malicious injury
to the property of Mr. Colwell, namely, Mrs. Colwell.
4 s
The Court further ruled that particular malevolence toward the hus-
band was not necessary.49 "Malice" was interpreted as a disregard
for the rights of others; the intent was manifested by the injurious
acts.5" A specific intent to hurt a particular person was not considered
an essential element. 5 1 The Court concluded that "a willful disregard
of what one knows to be his duty, an act which is against good morals
therefrom are nondischargeable. In re Kasler, 611 F.2d 308, 309-10 n.3 (1979) (attempt to hold
alter ego of corporation liable for libelous statements made by employees of corporation).
Fraudulent representations by one partner within the scope of the partnership business will
be imputed to the remaining partners, and the debts as to the latter will not be dischargeable.
3 Collier supra note 4 §523.08 at 523-52 (15th Ed. 1983). Liability is imputed regardless of
whether the defendant had knowledge of the agent's acts. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Braemoor
Associates, 686 F.2d 550, 558 (1982). But see In re Cornell, 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 744
(1984) (the statute, legislative history, and current case law reject imputing the intent of the
child to the parent-debtor for purposes of §523(a)(6)).
Compare In re Cecchini, 772 F.2d 1493 with In re Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1444. The original
opinion held that Cecchini's willful and malicious acts were not imputed to Robustelli; the
substituted opinion holds to the contrary. Id.
43. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6) (originally enacted as Bankruptcy Act of 1898 section 17(a)(2)).
In 1898, the exception was confined to "judgments" for injuries. Countryman, The New
Dischargeability Law, 45 REF. J. 1, 12 (1955). The 1898 Act was amended in 1903 by changing
the word "judgment" to "liability." Id. Thus, a liability for willful and malicious injury is
not affected by the fact that the liability was not reduced to judgment prior to the discharge
in bankruptcy. Id.; 78 A.L.R. 2d 1227.
44. 193 U.S. 473 (1902).
45. Criminal conversation means "defilement of the marriage bed, sexual intercourse of
an outsider with husband or wife, or breaking down of the covenant of fidelity." BLACKS
LAW DICTIONARY 336 (5th ed. 1979).
46. Tinker, 193 U.S. at 474.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 485.
49. Id. at 486.
50. Id. at 487.
51. Id.
1516
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and wrongful in and of itself, and which necessarily causes injury
and is done intentionally, may be said to be done willfully and
maliciously .... "52
Debts found nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6) typically fall
within one of two categories: (1) claims for conversion by a creditor
when the debtor has sold collateral subject to a security agreement,
thereby depriving the creditor of a secured interest; or (2) attempts by
a creditor to have previously-entered tort judgments against the debtor
found nondischargeable." 3 Tinker has been cited for support in cases
involving both conversion and tort judgments against the debtor.-"
A. Conversion
In 1916, the Supreme Court applied the Tinker interpretation of
"willful and malicious" to an intentional conversion of collateral by
the defendant. 55 In McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, a stockbroker sold
securities pledged to him by a customer and converted the funds to
his own use. 56 The court concluded that the stockbroker's conver-
sion, which began almost immediately after the pledge and was largely
consummated within nine days, was a case within the purview of
Tinker." According to the Tinker reasoning, malice toward the par-
ticular customer was not required." This was an immoral act, wrongful
in itself, and done with intentional disregard of a known duty to refrain
from selling the pledged securities.59 Consequently, the debt was not
discharged.60
In a later decision, Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co. ,61 the Supreme
Court averted the inference that every intentional act of conversion
was willful and malicious. In Davis, an auto dealer held his inven-
tory under trust receipts forbidding sale without the consent of the
finance institution. One of Davis' salesmen sold an auto without the
52. Id.
53. In re Kinsey, Bankr. L. Rep. 70520.
54. See e.g., Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1440 (conversion); McCloud, 7 Bankr. at 824-25; DeRosa,
20 Bankr. at 313; In re Fussell, 15 Bankr. at 1022; In re Finnie, 10 Bankr. at 263. See also
Adams, 761 F.2d at 1426 (previously-entered judgment); Wooten, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. at
996; Compos, 768 F.2d at 1157; Quezada, 718 F.2d at 122.
55. McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916). See Countryman, supra note 43 at 12
(discussion of the McIntyre case).
56. Mclntrye, 242 U.S. at 140.
57. Id. at 141.
58. Id. at 142.
59. Id. at 141.
60. Id. at 142.
61. 293 U.S. 328 (1934).
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consent of the finance company. Testimony was presented which tended
to show that cars held on like terms had been sold without express
consent on many other occasions, and the proceeds accounted for
thereafter. 2 On this occasion, however, the dealer promised to make
prompt remittance by check, but failed to do so and filed a bankruptcy
petition shortly thereafter."3
The Supreme Court reiterated the rule of McIntyre that a wrong
which is unexcused and wanton results in a nondischargeable debt. 4
The Court concluded, however, that every act of conversion does not
amount to a willful and malicious act."3 Rather, "an honest but
mistaken belief, engendered by a course of dealing, that powers have
been enlarged or incapacities removed," is an innocent or technical
conversion which may lack any element of willfulness or maliciousness
necessary to except the liability from discharge.6 6 Based on the fore-
going, one commentator concluded that a conversion which is (1)
unintentional or (2) intentional, but committed under an honest but
mistaken belief that the act was not wrongful, is not excepted from
discharge as a willful and malicious injury.
67
Section 17(a)(2) of the prior Bankruptcy Act 8 contained a provi-
sion similar to the current section 523(a)(6). The old section 17(a)(2),
however, specifically precluded discharge of liabilities for willful and
malicious conversion.69 The legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 indicates that a substantive change was not in-
tended by the deletion of the express reference to willful and malicious
conversion." Rather, legislative history states that the change was
designed to include in the category of nondischargeable debts a con-
version under which the debtor willfully and maliciously intended to
borrow property for a short period of time with no intent to inflict
injury, but when injury was in fact inflicted.' Thus, under the cur-
rent Bankruptcy Code, "willful and malicious" injury includes a willful
and malicious conversion."
62. Id. at 330.
63. Davis, 293 U.S. at 330.
64. Id. at 332.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Countryman, supra note 43 at 14.
68. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6) (originally enacted as Bankruptcy Act of 1898 section 17(a)(2)).
69. 2 Bankr. L. Ed. §7:122 at 128.
70. Id. at 128-29; 9A Am Jur 2d Bankruptcy §804; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 364.
71. 124 Cong. Rec. H11096 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1978).
72. Id.
1518
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Though the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue since deciding Davis, courts have utilized greatly conflicting in-
terpretations of "willful and malicious injury." In In re Hodges,"
for instance, a debtor sold stereo equipment which was subject to
a security interest.74 Defendant became financially burdened because
of illness and used the proceeds from the sale of the equipment to
make house payments, purchase food and support his family.
Moreover, the defendant testified that he did not realize that the plain-
tiff held a security interest. 5 The bankruptcy court held that the debtor
did not sell the equipment maliciously, and accordingly, the debt was
discharged.
6
Case law prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 had demonstrated that the applicable standard in construing
section 17(a)(2) was the Tinker standard of "reckless disregard." 77
Thus, the intentional conversion of property without consent of the
secured lender or other excuse was considered a willful and malicious
injury. 8
Hodges held that, with the change in bankruptcy law in 1978, Con-
gress expressly overruled Tinker v. Colwell to the extent that Tinker
held that:
[t]he requirement of willfulness and maliciousness should not be given
a narrow construction, and that a willful disregard of what one
knows to be his duty, an act which is against good morals and
wrongful in and of itself, and which necessarily causes injury and
is done intentionally, may be said to be done willfully and maliciously
so as to come within the exception from discharge.79
Without the Tinker standard of intent, only one choice exists: to be
willful and malicious, the debtor must have a conscious "intent to
cause harm to the creditor or the creditor's property."80 Maliciousness
could no longer be implied.8' Therefore, unless the debtor's purpose
73. In re Hodges, 4 Bankr. 513 (1980).
74. Id. at 514.
75. Id. The terms were in small print on the back page of the security agreement, thus,
not conspicuous to defendant. Id. at 514.
76. Id. at 517.
77. Id. at 515.
78. Tinker, 193 U.S. at 487.
79. Hodges, 4 Bankr. at 514-15 (quoting Tinker, 193 U.S. at 487). See also 3 Collier supra
note 4 523.16(3) (15th Ed. 1979); 3 Bankr. L. Ed. §22:35.
80. Hodges, 4 Bankr. at 516. See e.g., In re Compos, 768 F.2d at 1158; In re Egan,
52 Bankr. 501, 508 (1985); In re Behr, 42 Bankr. 922, 925 (1984); In re McLaughlin, 14 Bankr.
773, 775 (1981).
81. Hodges, 4 Bankr. at 516. But see United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 9 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 745, 748-49 (1983) (a finding of malice should be premised upon an implied or construc-
tive malicious intent).
1519
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in selling the secured property was to harm the creditor, the debt
is dischargeable.82 When the debtor has other purposes,83 remits a
portion of the proceeds to the secured creditor," ' or continues to make
loan payments,85 the debt is dischargeable.
The court in Hodges further buttressed this position by noting that
in Davis, the Supreme Court held that a technical or innocent con-
version lacks the elements of maliciousness, and that malice must en-
compass "an intent to harm" the creditor.8 6 Applying this standard
to the facts of Hodges, the court held that though the defendant's
act of conversion was willful, the defendant did not appear to have
acted maliciously. 7
On the other hand, many courts interpret both the ruling in Tinker
and the legislative history quite differently. 8 In In re McCloud,89 for
example, the court held that the debtor's disposition of livestock
securing loans was both a malicious and a willful conversion because
the collateral was sold intentionally and in knowing disregard of the
rights of the bank.90 Referring to the same language in the legislative
history which overrules Tinker, quoted by the court in Hodges, the
court in McCloud made similar findings that the legislative history
demonstrated that the injury caused by the debtor must be shown
to have been "intentional" and not merely resulting from "reckless
disregard of the creditor's rights." 9' Nothing in the legislative history
of section 523(a)(6), however, suggests that Congress intended to over-
rule the Tinker interpretation of the term "malicious.
'92
82. See Hodges, 4 Bankr. at 517; In re Gentis, 10 Bankr. 209, 213 (1981); In re Nelson,
4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 548, 549 (1981).
83. See e.g., Hodges, 4 Bankr. at 517 (raising money for living expenses); McLaughlin,
14 Bankr. at 775 (sold secured property in attempt to meet bills).
84. See In re Langer, 12 Bankr. 957, 960 (1981); In re Hawkins, 6 Bankr. 97 (1980).
85. See In re Harris, 8 Bankr. 88 (1980).
86. Hodges, 4 Bankr. at 516.
87. Id. at 517.
88. See e.g., In re Fry, 14 Bankr. 864, 866 (1981) (section 523(a)(6) does not require an
"intent to do harm"); In re McGiboney, 8 Bankr. 987, 989 (1981); In re DeRosa, 20 Bankr.
at 313; In re Ayres, 25 Bankr. 762, 775 (1982); In re Clark, 30 Bankr. 685, 687 (1983).
89. 7 Bankr. 819 (1980).
90. Id. at 826.
91. Id. at 825; see H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong. Ist Sess. 363 (1977); S. Rep. No.
989, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 77-79, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1978, p. 5787,
6320 (1978).
92. McCloud, 7 Bankr. at 825. Careful reading of the troublesome passage of the Com-
mittee Report indicates, arguably, that Congress, in overruling Tinker, was referring only to
the Tinker definition of "willfull":
Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another
person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, willful means
deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell [citations omitted] held
that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied
on Tinker to apply a reckless disregard standard, they are overruled. [italics added]
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The holding in Tinker did not turn on whether the debtor's con-
duct had been "willful". The United States Supreme Court stated
that the act had been intentional and voluntary, and thus clearly had
been willful for purposes of section 17(a)(2).93 The emphasis of the
case was whether the conduct of the debtor had been malicious for
the purposes of section 17(a)(2). 9" The Court stated that malicious
destruction of property did not require proof of special malice toward
the injured party, but only an "act which was unlawful, wrongful
and tortious, and, being willfully done. . . ."I' In other words, the
law will imply a degree of malice from a particular act.96 The Tinker
Court further qualified the holding by finding that not every willful
act which is wrong implies malice.9 7 Based on this reasoning, the
McCloud court held that an intent to do the wrongful act was suffi-
cient to preclude discharge of McCloud's debt.9"
Furthermore, the implied malice standard is in harmony with the
policy underlying the preferred position of secured creditors in
bankruptcy proceedings. 99 Adherence to the strict "intent to injure"
standard effectively denies the secured creditor the property relied upon
as security by placing an almost insurmountable burden on the creditor
to prove the subjective intent of the debtor to harm the creditor or
the creditor's property.100 In accordance with these policy concerns
S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-79, U.S. Code & Ad. News 2978, 5787, 5865
(1978). However, no clear indication exists that Congress intended to overrule those cases inter-
preting the malice definition set forth in Tinker.
93. McCloud, 7 Bankr. at 824; Tinker, 193 U.S. at 485. Bankruptcy courts have con-
sistently defined "willful" as intentional or deliberate. United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson,
9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 745, 747 (1983).
94. McCloud, 7 Bankr. at 825.
95. Tinker, 193 U.S. at 486.
96. See id.; United Bank of Southgate, 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d at 749.
97. Tinker, 193 U.S. at 489.
98. McCloud, 7 Bankr. at 826.
99. United Bank of Southgate, 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d at 758. This looser standard of
"intent to act," from which malice will be implied, protects the integrity of secured property
and does not render the security agreement a meaningless instrument. In the Matter of Nelson,
10 Bankr. 691, 692 (1981).
100. United Bank of Southgate, 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d at 752. How the "intent to in-
jure" standard could ever be applied in the typical commercial situation when a debtor wrongfully
sells or disposes of secured property is difficult to imagine. Id. at 753.
But cf. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(B) (provides that a debtor will not be discharged from a debt
if he has caused to be made or published a materially false written statement with "intent
to deceive"). "Intent" for §523(a)(2)(B) purposes is actual intent-not an objective, reasonable
person standard but essentially a subjective standard requiring evaluation of the present debtor
at time of the representation on a case-by-case basis. In re Hunt, 30 Bankr. 425 (1983).
Furthermore, intent to deceive may logically be inferred when a person knowingly or recklessly
makes a false representation which he knows or should know will induce another to make
a loan. Carini v. Matera, 592 F.2d 378, 380 (1979). Ostensibly, policy considerations have not
prevented Congress from applying a subjective intent standard to the false representation exception
to dischargeability of debts.
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and expounding the McCloud rationale, the Ninth Circuit Court in
In re Cecchini articulated the rule that a wrongful act such as con-
version, done intentionally, which necessarily -produces harm and is
without just cause or excuse, is willful and malicious, even without
proof of a specific intent to injure.'0 '
B. Tort Judgments
A great deal of confusion exists as to how to treat cases that lie
between the areas where the injury is produced by ordinary negligence
and where the injury is the result of a deliberate and intentional wrong-
doing.'0 2 Under the Bankruptcy Code, courts generally look behind
the judgment to the nature of the action in which the judgment was
rendered.' 3 If mere negligence was the essence of the action, the debt
would ordinarily be considered dischargeable.°'0
1. Majority: Negligence Alone is Insufficient
A majority of cases have decided that no degree of negligence can
produce a willful and malicious injury; rather, intent to injure is
necessary to except a debt from discharge.' °5 This view is buttressed
by the theory that exceptions to discharge impair the fresh start policy
of bankruptcy, and that since the statute is highly remedial, these
exceptions should be narrowly construed.1
0 6
Moreover, the underlying purpose of the fresh start policy of the
Bankruptcy Code is to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
See also former 11 U.S.C. §14c(4) (denies discharge if the bankrupt has ". . . filed a petition
in bankruptcy, transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed any of his property with intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors."). The requirement of specific, actual intent is the
core of section 14c(4). Bankruptcy - Discharge - Analysis of "Actual Intent" Test as Applied
to Section 14c(4) of the Bankruptcy Act, 22 VILL. L. REV. 1042, 1044 (1977). Upon the enact-
ment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, section 14c was replaced by 11 U.S.C. §727(a)(2).
101. Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1496. Moreover, the legislative record, arguably, explicitly in-
dicates that a specific "intent to harm" is contrary to Congressional intent. "The intent is to
include in the category of nondischargeable debts a conversion under which the debtor willfully
and maliciously intends to borrow property for a short period of time with no intent to inflict
injury but in which injury is in fact inflicted." In re Scotella, 18 Bankr. 975, 977 (1982) (citing
H.R. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 364 U.S. Cong. & Ad. News, 1978, 6320
(1977)).
102. Porter, supra note 3, at 53.
103. Id. See e.g., Coen, 458 F.2d at 329; Adams, 761 F.2d at 1427; In re Hamanaka,
53 Bankr. 320, 323 (1985); In re Behr, 42 Bankr. 922, 925 (1984).
104. Porter, supra note 3, at 53.
105. See 9A Am Jur 2d Bankruptcy §805.
106. See Porter, supra note 3, at 53.
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oppressive indebtedness with leave to start afresh.' ° 7 Courts follow-
ing this view find support in the legislative history of section 523(a)(6),
again, focusing on Congress' overruling of the "reckless disregard"
standard of Tinker. 08 The dicta in Tinker stated that "[o]ne who
negligently runs over an individual would not . . . be within the
exception. True he drives negligently, and that is a wrongful act, but
he does not intentionally drive over the individual. If he intentionally
did drive over him, it would certainly be malicious."'' 09 Therefore,
under this construction, the legislative history indicates that only
deliberate and intentional acts should be considered "willful," and
that mere reckless disregard will not qualify."10
2. Minority: Significance of Negligence versus Reckless Conduct
The contrary view favors the interpretation that willful and malicious
injuries do not necessarily connote ill-will or special malice."' Under
this view, section 523(a)(6) describes a "wrongful act done in utter
disregard of the legal rights of others and without just or lawful sup-
port, evidencing a reckless disregard and indifference to the safety
of human life, resulting in injury." '"12 This view is based, in part,
on the theory that bankruptcy should not be allowed to function as
107. See Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The Debtor's
Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 427 (1974). Daniel Webster delivered a compassionate speech
in favor of debtor relief:
There are probably one or two hundred thousand debtors, honest, sober, and in-
dustrious, who drag out lives useless to their country, for no reason but that they
cannot be legally discharged from debts in which misfortunes have involved them,
and which there is no possibility of their ever paying. . . . It is true they are not
imprisoned; but there may be, and there are, restraint and bondage outside the walls
of the jail, as well as in. Their power of earning is, in truth, taken away; their faculty
of useful employment is paralyzed, and hope itself becomes extinguished. . . . Many
of these insolvent persons are young men with young families. Like other men, they
have capacities both for action and enjoyment. Are we to stifle all these forever?
Are we to suffer all these persons, many of them meritorious and respectable, to
be pressed to the earth forever, by load of hopeless debt? . . .
Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The Debtor's Fresh Start,
76 W. VA. L. REV. 427, 438-39 (1974) (citing Speech of May 18, 1840, reprinted in Speeches
and Orations of Daniel Webster 471 et seq. (Whipple ed. 1879), and under the title The Fault
Is Not in the Constitution, in THE GOLDEN AGE OF AmucAN LAw 373, 377-79 (Haar ed. 1965)).
108. See Compos, 768 F.2d at 1157 (interprets legislative record to entirely overrule Tinker);
Hodges, 4 Bankr. at 515; In the Matter of Ricketts, 16 Bankr. 833, 834 (1982); In re Aldrich,
16 Bankr. 825, 829-30 (1982); In the Matter of Gentis, 10 Bankr. 209, 213 (1981); In re Graham,
7 Bankr. 5, 7 (1980); In re Nelson, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 548, 549 (1981).
109. Tinker, 193 U.S. at 489.
110. See Compos, 768 F.2d at 1157; Matter of Quezada, 718 F.2d at 122.
1l1. Porter, supra note 3, at 53. See also In re Scotella, 18 Bankr. at 977; In re DeRosa,
20 Bankr. 307, 313 (1982); In the Matter of Klix, 23 Bankr. 187, 190 (1982); In the Matter
of Chambers, 23 Bankr. 206, 210 (1982); In re Fussell, 15 Bankr. at 1022 (1981); In re
Ries, 22 Bankr. 343, 346-47 (1982).
112. See Porter, supra note 3, at 53.
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a refuge for reckless tortfeasors, and that to rule otherwise would
debilitate state laws which attempt to control reckless conduct, such
as reckless driving." 3
In In re Franklin," for instance, defendant prescribed an anesthetic
without a patient history, over induced the patient with anesthesia,
and covered up the records relating to the surgery and subsequent
cardiac arrest.' '" The court found that the actions of the defendant
amounted to a willful breach of duty and a complete and total
disregard of acceptable medical practice." 6 The court did not find
that the defendant performed the surgery in an attempt to bring about
the cardiac arrest. The defendant, however, clearly did intend to per-
form the particular acts in question. Unfortunately, when these acts
were performed in the manner and under the conditions present in
this situtation, they resulted in injury.'' 7 This finding was sufficient
to support a finding of willful and malicious conduct, and the debt
was not discharged.""
In re Adams,"9 a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion,
decided several months prior to Cecchini, provided a clear statement
of the reasoning utilized by that court. In Adams, judgment was
entered against the defendant for voluntarily drinking and subsequently
driving while intoxicated, thus causing an accident and severely in-
juring the plaintiff. 2 The court gleaned from a review of legislative
history the same congressional intent found by courts in cases holding
that "intent to injure" is required.' 2' That is, Congress intended that
an act done in reckless disregard of possible consequences is not suf-
ficient to classify the act as willful and malicious under section
523(a)(6).' 2 2 In other words, an intentional act is required. The
similarity in interpreting the legislative history, however, ends here.
Personal ill-will, concluded the Adams court, was not required for
a finding of willful and malicious injury.' 23
113. See Poff, Dischargeability of Bankrupt's Liability For Personal Injuries Caused By
Reckess Driving, 29 REF. J. 70, 71 (1955).
114. 726 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984).




119. 761 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1985).
120. Id. at 1423.
121. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. 365, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code & Ad.
News 5787, 5963, 6320-21. See also Compos, 768 F.2d at 1159 (citing In re Kuepper, 36 Bankr.
680 (1983); In re Hoppa, 31 Bankr. 753 (1983); In re Davis, 26 Bankr. 580 (1983); In re Silas,
24 Bankr. 771 (1982)).
122. Adams, 761 F.2d at 1426.
123. See Matter of Wooten, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 995.
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In 1984, Congress enacted 11 USC 523(a)(9), which, in the view
of the Adams court, prescribed the manner in which the court should
construe section 523(a)(6). 24 Section 523(a)(9) provides explicitly that
debts arising from liabilities incurred as a result of drunk driving are
nondischargeable. 125 The legislative history underlying the 1984 amend-
ment makes clear that Congress intended to clarify section 523.126
The position of the Adams court was based on two premises: (1)
an injury resulting from drunk driving lacks the specific intent to in-
jure, and (2) Congress enacted section 523(a)(9) which expressly makes
debts incurred as a result of drunk driving nondischargeable. The
Adams court thus concluded that the nondischargeability of debts does
not rest on a determination that the debtor possessed the specific in-
tent to injure.'27 The conclusion therefore follows that the intentional
doing of an act which necessarily leads to injury is determinative of
whether a debt resulting therefrom will be nondischargeable.' 28
The bankruptcy opinions are split in construing the meaning of sec-
tion 523(a)(6). All cases agree that Congress rejected the Tinker
"reckless disregard" definition of "willfull." Instead, courts define
"willful" to be intentional or deliberate. 2 9 Courts, however, come
to different results in interpreting "malicious." One line of cases reads
the legislative history to entirely obviate Tinker.30 Consequently, these
courts translate malicious to require an "intent to cause harm." The
second line of cases, represented by the Ninth Circuit in Cecchini and
124. Adams, 761 F.2d at 1426. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(9) provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge
an individual from any debt . . . (9) to any entity, to the extent that such debt
arises from a judgment or consent decree entered in a court of record against the
debtor wherein liability was incurred by such debtor as a result of the debtor's operation
of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated under the laws or regulations of any
jurisdiction within the United States or its territories wherein such motor vehicle was
operated and within which such liability was incurred.
125. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(9).
126. Adams, 761 F.2d at 1426. In describing the various Bankruptcy Code amendments
that were being adopted, the Chairman of the House Committee of the Judiciary stated that
"[section 523(a)(9)] clarifies present law relating to the nondischargeability of debts incurred
by drunk drivers. Debts incurred by persons driving while intoxicated are presumed to be willfully
and maliciously incurred under this provision." Id.; 130 Cong. Rec. H7489 (daily ed. June 29,
1984) (statement of Rep. Rodino), reprinted in 6 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 576, 577.
127. Adams, 761 F.2d at 1426.
128. Id. at 1427. Furthermore, the author of the amendment, Senator DeConcini, stated
on the floor of the Senate, "[B]ankruptcy was never meant to be a shield behind which drunk
drivers and others who have acted in a reckless manner, can absolve themselves of liability.
The concept of fresh start for a debtor must defer to the possibility of a fresh start of the
innocent victim .... Wooten, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 996.
129. See e.g., Cecchini, 780 F.2d at 1495; Langer, 12 Bankr. at 959; Compos, 768 F.2d
at 1157.
130. See McLaughlin, 14 Bankr. at 773; Aldrich, 16 Bankr. at 825; Finnie, 10 Bankr. at
262; Nelson, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d at 548.
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Adams, reason that Congress did not intend to strike down the Tinker
definition of "malicious," and interpret "malicious" as implied or
constructive malice, similar to the construction of that term in
Tinker.'3' Thus, the Ninth Circuit, and other circuits following the
Cecchini view, hold that section 523(a)(6) requires merely an intent
to act which necessarily results in harm to make a debt non-
dischargeable. While interpretation of section 523(a)(6) presents a prob-
lem in determining which debts are nondischargeable under Chapter
7 bankruptcy proceedings, this quandary does not arise under Chapter
13 proceedings because debts resulting from willful and malicious in-
juries are nevertheless dischargeable under Chapter 13.
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Up to this point, this note has discussed nondischargeability of debts
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 523 delineates several
exceptions to the dischargeability of debts under Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceedings. The court in Cecchini applied the "willful and malicious
injury" exception to deny the petitioner's request to discharge the
liability resulting from conversion of property. The court would have
arrived at a contrary result, however, if Mr. Cecchini had filed
bankruptcy under Chapter 13, rather than Chapter 7.
With only two exceptions, all debts are dischargeable under a
Chapter 13 plan.'32 The Code clearly states that the only debts which
are not dischargeable in a Chapter 13 case are family support
obligations 3 3 and long-term payments which extend beyond the pay-
131. See DeRosa, 20 Bankr. at 307; McCloud, 7 Bankr. at 819; Ries, 22 Bankr. at 343;
Auvenshine, 9 Bankr. at 772.
132. 11 U.S.C. §1328(a). Section 1328(a) states:
As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under the
plan, unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor
after the order for relief under this chapter, the court shall grant the debtor a discharge
of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title,
except any debt-
(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5) of this title; or
(2) of the kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title.
See Id. §606(7). "Plan" means "a plan for a composition or extension, or both, proposed
in a proceeding under this chapter." Id. A plan must deal with unsecured debts generally,
and may deal severally with debts secured other than by an estate in real property or a chattel
real. 10 Collier on Bankruptcy 122.08 at 45. The debtor must submit the plan at the initial
meeting of creditors, and proposals are not accepted from creditors. Id. A plan is not binding
on any parties unless confirmed by the bankruptcy court. Id. at 45-46.
133. Id. §523(a)(5). Section 523(a)(5) states:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge
an individual debtor from any debt-
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance
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ment period of the Chapter 13 plan.' 34 No other exceptions exist.
Therefore, a debt for willful and malicious injury is dischargeable
upon the completion of a Chapter 13 plan by the debtor.' 35
Under Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor submits a
plan under which the debtor will pay some proportion of all obliga-
tions. 1 6 Thus, creditors generally receive more under a Chapter 13
repayment plan than under the straight liquidation of debts under
Chapter 7.3 The Bankruptcy Code requires confirmation of the plan
by the bankruptcy court. 3 ' Section 1324 of the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides, however, that any party in interest may object to the confir-
mation of the Chapter 13 plan.' 39 An objection to the confirmation
is predicated on the failure of the plan or the procedures employed
prior to confirmation to conform with the requirements set forth in
section 1325.140
for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement,
divorce decree, or property settlement agreement ...
Id.
134. 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(5). Section 1322(b)(5) pertains to curing defaults where the last
payment will occur after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due. Id.
135. See In re Tackaberry, BLD 68302 (1981) (debt for willful and malicious injury is
dischargeable under Chapter 13 plan); In re Keckler, 3 Bankr. 155 (1980); In re Lewis, 5 Bankr.
575 (1980); In re Seely, 6 Bankr. 309 (1980). That a debt for willful and malicious injury
is not dischargeable under Chapter 7 but is dischargeable under Chapter 13 seems incongruous.
Tackaberry, BLD 68302 at 79611. Yet, the legislative history clearly manifests this intent.
Id. Between the introduction of H.R. 6 in January 1977 and the introduction of the revised
H.R. 8200 in July of the same year, the discharge exception for alimony and child support
was simply "added" to the bankruptcy reform legislation before the House. This was done
despite repeated testimony at House Hearings that all the discharge exceptions enumerated in
Chapter 7 should be explicitly excepted from Chapter 13. See Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hear-
ings on H.R. 31 and 32. Before Sub Comm. on Civ. and Const. Rights of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 1430, 2128 (1975-76). The Senate version of the bill
never contained the alimony exception but rather excepted debts arising from "willful and
malicious conduct." This discrepancy between the bills was subsequently glossed over in a re-
numbering of the Senate bill, and the House version was hastily enacted in the final days of
the 95th Congress. Matter of Brown, 7 Bankr. 529, 530 n.1 (1980). A recently proposed Code
revision, S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 9 Bankr. L. Ed. §81:6,59, which was passed
by the Senate in October 1979, would have eliminated the discharge discrepancy between Chapters
7 and 13. According to House Judiciary Committee Counsel, however, this change has been
dropped from the House version of the bill because the discrepancy provides a practical incen-
tive to the use of Chapter 13 proceedings, which were seldom used prior to the adoption of
the new Code. Id. at 530 n.2.
136. See 11 U.S.C. §§1321 (filing of plan), 1322 (contents of plan). See 10 Collier on Bankr.
29.01-29.12.
137. See e.g., In re Hudson, 9 Bankr. 363, 367 (1981).
138. 11 U.S.C. §1325(a).
139. Id. §1324. The bankruptcy judge is required to provide notice and an opportunity
for hearing any objections to confirmation. S. Rep. No. 95-989 to accompany S. 2266, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) p. 142.
140. S. Rep. No. 95-989 to accompany S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) p. 142.
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Under section 1325, the court is required to confirm the plan if
certain requirements are met.' 4' Most importantly, the plan must be
proposed in good faith,' 2 must be in the best interest of creditors, 43
141. 11 U.S.C. §1325(a). Section 1325 states:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan if-
(I) the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with other
applicable provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28, or
by plan, to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden
by law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is
not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate
of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien
securing such claim; and (ii) the value, as of the effective date of the
plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such
claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder;
and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply
with the plan.
(b) After confirmation of a plan, the court may order any entity from whom the
debtor receives income to pay all or any part of such income to the trustee.
142. Id. §1325(a)(3). Good faith is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code. In re Powell, 2
Bankr. 314, 315 (1980); In re Sadler, 3 Bankr. 536, 536 (1980); In re Ward, 6 Bankr. 93,
96 (1980). The general inquiry is directed to whether there has been an abuse of the provisions,
purpose, or spirit of Chapter 13 in the proposal or plan. 10 Collier at 129.06(6). Consequently,
the fact that good faith has not been defined has been held to "repose great discretion in
the court." Powell, 2.Bankr. at 315. The amount of payments under the debtors' plans has
been an area of controversy. See In re lacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256 (1980) (good faith requires
debtor to make at least some payments; rejects "zero payment plans"); but see In re Cloutier,
3 Bankr. 584 (1980) (plan offering no payments is a strong factor against approving the plan,
but not determinative); see generally In Good Faith, Zero Plans and the Purposes of Bank-
ruptcy Code Chapter 13: A Legislative Solution to the Controversy, 61 B.U. L. REv.
773 (1981) (critique on the judicial acceptance of zero plans for unsecured creditors under Chapter
13); Neustadter, Consumer Insolvency Counseling for Californians in the 1980's, 19 SANTA
CiARA L. REV. 817 (1979) (proposing and implementing a plan where nothing or only a trivial
sum is paid to unsecured creditors is possible under Chapter 13); Bankruptcy: Good Faith and
the Zero Payment Plan in Chapter 13, 69 KENTUCKY L.J. 327 (1980-81) (quantitative state-
ment of trends in reported cases).
One commentator concluded that the requirement that the plan be "proposel in good faith"
has resulted in more litigation than any other issue. Cyr, "Good Faith" Tempest: An Analysis
and Proposal for Change, 55 BANKR. L.J. 271 (1981). Moreover, the application of the good
faith requirement-is the only barrier to the use by dishonest debtors of §1328(a) as a device
for abuse. In re Marlow, 3 Bankr. 305, 307 (1980).
143. 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(4). The "best interest of the creditor test" requires that the value
of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each unsecured claim must not
be less than the amount that would have been paid on the claim if the estate and debtor were
liquidated under Chapter 7. Bankr. L. Ed. §46.50. If the best interest test is satisfied regarding
unsecured claims, failure of unsecured creditors to accept the plan will not bar confirmation.
Id. The -plan will be confirmed if secured creditors have accepted the plan, or the secured
creditor will retain the lien securing the claim and the value of the property to be distributed
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and must be feasible.' 4 4 If the plan meets the confirmation standards,
the court must confirm the plan; the court has no discretion.'
4
1
The discharge under section 1328(a) of Chapter 13 is more com-
prehensive than the discharge under section 523 of Chapter 7.146 An
important advantage available under Chapter 13 is that the debtor
can obtain a release from nondischargeable, unsecured debts, other
than claims entitled to priority or for alimony or child maintenance,
by partial payment of claims under a composition plan.'47 A debt
nondischargeable under Chapter 7, such as a debt for embezzlement,
for money obtained by fraud, for willful and malicious injury to the
person or property of another, for a fine or for an educational loan,
can be compromised, under Chapter 13, in the same manner as other
debts.'" On payment of the amount provided in a composition plan
dealing with any such claim, the debtor is entitled to receive a discharge
of the balance of the claim.' 39
The practical effect of section 1328 is to give debtors an "incen-
tive" to use Chapter 13 proceedings. 5 0 Theoretically, this "incentive"
benefit can be justified on the ground that the Chapter 13 debtor
is at least attempting to "make good" on the debts, whereas the
Chapter 7 debtor, who does not get the benefit, is not. 5 ' Yet in cases
involving debts arising out of willful and malicious injuries, debtors
often get the benefit of Chapter 13 without paying a fair proportion
of the debtor's obligations when the bankruptcy court confirms a plan
proposing nominal payments.'
5 2
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to relieve
the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and
allow a fresh start free from the obligations of business misfortunes.1
5
1
under the plan on account of the claim not less than the allowed amount of the claim. Id.
at §46.51. Normally, the court has little difficulty in finding that the plan is in the best in-
terests of creditors because the debtor usually does not own any realizable assets which could
provide any kind of dividend in straight bankruptcy, thus the Chapter 13 plan offers a greater
gain to those creditors. 10 Collier at 129.06(3).
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The Cecchini standard for section 523(a)(6) appears to hinder that
objective by defining "willful and malicious injury" broadly, causing
a wider range of debts to be held nondischargeable. Keeping in mind
that under section 523 the debtor has committed an intentional,
wrongful act, Chapter 13, nevertheless, provides relief for the debtor
who does not wish to shirk all financial obligations, but who instead
is willing to accept a feasible repayment plan which satisfies a por-
tion of the debtor's liabilities.' 54
CONCLUSION
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide
the honest debtor a fresh start free from burdensome financial obliga-
tions. Accordingly, exceptions to discharge under bankruptcy are to
be narrowly construed in favor of the debtor. The purpose of section
523(a)(6) is to preserve the discharge feature from abuse and to deny
the benefits to those who have been shown to be unworthy of the
benefits in the ways specified by the section. Courts reading section
523(a)(6) to require the debtor to have intended to injure the creditor
may be using the subjective intent of the debtor as a means of
distinguishing the honest debtor from the dishonest debtor; only the
honest debtor will receive the full benefit of a fresh start under the
Bankruptcy Code. On the other hand, courts following the Cecchini
reasoning find that an implied intent to injure sufficiently separates
the honest from the dishonest debtor. The Cecchini decision does not
foreclose discharge to debtors who have intentionally or inadvertently
become unable to meet financial obligations, but rather, only debtors
who have intentionally acted in such a manner as to necessarily cause
harm to the creditor will be forced to pay the creditor despite filing
bankruptcy. Thus, for debtors who have not acted wrongly, the fresh
start policy is still promoted by the holding in Cecchini.
Jeffrey H. Ochrach
154. See 11 U.S.C. §1328.
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